Free tool · Supabase
Your RLS is on. Can a stranger still read your tables?
Paste your schema and this simulates three people against every table: a stranger holding the public key from your JavaScript, someone who signed up five minutes ago, and the row’s real owner. You see who can read, create, change and delete, why, and the exact fix.
Runs in your browser. Your schema is never uploaded, and no data is needed: only table, policy, view and function definitions.
What it catches
Beyond “RLS enabled”.
- Tables in the public schema with RLS off: open to anyone with your public key.
- using (true), auth.role() = ’authenticated’ and auth.uid() is not null: “any user, every row”.
- Writes (UPDATE, DELETE, FOR ALL) any user can perform on other users’ rows.
- UPDATE policies whose WITH CHECK is weaker than USING: rows can be handed to another owner.
- Policies that read user_metadata, which every user can edit: self-service admin.
- Views that bypass RLS (no security_invoker) and SECURITY DEFINER functions callable over RPC.
Questions
Good to know.
How is this different from checking that RLS is enabled?
A table can have RLS enabled and still be fully readable: one permissive policy with using (true) lets everyone it applies to see every row, because policies are OR-ed. This tool evaluates the policies the way PostgreSQL combines them and tells you who actually gets in.
Is my schema uploaded?
No. The analysis runs in your browser and nothing is sent. It only needs definitions (tables, policies, views, functions), never data. AI assistants and scripts can use the same engine through the API or the MCP tool analyze_supabase_rls.
Where do I get my schema?
Run supabase db dump -f schema.sql with the Supabase CLI, paste your migrations, or copy the export query from this page into the SQL editor and paste its single result cell.
Can a clean result prove my app is safe?
No. It shows your policies don't open tables to strangers or to every user, under the assumptions listed with the result. Edge Functions, server code, storage and service-role usage can still expose data. That is what the Launch Check tests, with two real accounts.
Guides
Fix it properly.
- Supabase · LovableSupabase RLS is enabled, but my data is still public. Why?Row Level Security can be on and still let anyone read every row. How using (true), PUBLIC role defaults and OR-ed permissive policies leak data, and the exact policies that fix it.
- Supabase · LovableI exposed my Supabase service_role key. What do I do now?The service_role (secret) key bypasses Row Level Security. How to rotate it, find out whether it was used, and move privileged work out of the browser, in the right order.
- Supabase · PostgreSQLNever use user_metadata in Supabase RLS policiesAny signed-in user can edit their own user_metadata from the browser. A policy that reads a role or tenant from it lets users make themselves admin. Use app_metadata or a table instead.
- Stripe · Next.jsVerify Stripe webhook signatures (Next.js and Supabase Edge Functions)An unverified webhook lets anyone fake a payment and unlock your paid plan. Verifying the raw body in Next.js route handlers and Supabase Edge Functions, plus idempotency and what not to trust.